"I have been authorized to disclose publicly that waterboarding is not
among those methods. Accordingly, waterboarding is not, and may not be,
used in the current program. There is a defined process by which any new method
is proposed for authorization. That process would begin with the CIA Director's
determination that the addition of the technique was required for the
program. Then, the Attorney General would have to determine that the use
of the technique is lawful under the particular conditions and circumstances
proposed. Finally, the President would have to approve of the use of the
technique as requested by the CIA Director and as deemed lawful by the Attorney
A little more complicated than this, no?
Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Dianne Feinstein told The Associated
Press in an interview this week that there is a clear distinction between those
who made the policies and those who carried them out.
"They (the CIA) carry out orders and the orders come from the (National Security Council) and the White House, so there's not a lot of policy debate that goes on there," she said. "We're going to continue our looking into the situation and I think that is up to the administration and the director."
Also Mukasey's letter compliments some of the language in the Senate Armed Services Committee Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody. I quoted all references to the CIA in that document here. Page 5 for instance reads "In the spring of 2002, CIA sought policy approval from the National Security Council (NSC) to begin an interrogation program for high-level al-Qaida terrorists." In seeking that policy, is the CIA dependent wholly upon the White House lawyers? Wouldn't they cooperate with their own legal staff before making requests of the NSC?
Taking a page from Jane Mayer's "The Dark Side," p.38-39:
"Late in the afternoon of Sunday, September 16, Black emerged from his
self-imposed exile in Langley to show the project he had been working so hard on
all week to the allied British intelligence officials, who were still gathered
in Washington...Black brought a draft of a proposed new, top-secret
presidential "finding" that he and the CIA lawyers had been hammering out all week. Formally called "Memoranda of Notifications" in the Bush
White House, or MONs, they were legal memos detailing proposed covert actions,
all of which required presidential authorization, according to laws that had
been in place since the Agency's founding in 1947. Black's proposed new
finding was an amalgamation of years' worth of thinking about all the powers the
Agency might like to exercise in its fondest dreams....
The proposed finding included the inauguration of secret paramilitary death
squads authorized to hunt and kill prime terror suspects anywhere on earth. A week earlier, these deaths would have been classified as illegal assassinations. Under the new legal analysis, such killings were sanctioned as acts of national 'self-defense.'" [emphasis supplied]
This is a separate issue from the torture memos, but still illuminating. It suggests that the CIA's lawyers work closely alongside CIA staff in the preparation of their requests higher up the chain of command. And if this process was followed in the case of some of the torture authorizations, you have to wonder what those lawyers were thinking - they could be as guilty of giving poor legal advice as Yoo and Gonzales. Which is a big problem - I don't think the rules of the legal profession change if it so happens you work at an intelligence agency.
What's worse is what Mayer writes on p.41: "As soon as he received the paperwork, on Monday, September 17, Bush eagerly signed the new intelligence finding. He had been so enthused when he first heard about it from Tenet and Black at a cabinet meeting at Camp David that weekend according to Bob Woodward's account Bush at War, the President almost shouted 'Great job!' With the stroke of the President's pen, the most important post-Watergate prohibition imposed by Congress on the CIA would be erased, with only a handful of individual's knowledge."
So it appears that a day after Bush received the memo from Black (or the day of!), he signed it. The memo was in draft form on Sept. 16. This caught the attention of some at CIA ("The Dark Side," p.42-43):
"Inside the Agency, Drumheller and a few others were worried. The September 17
Memorandum of Notification had moved much faster than usual. Generally, after
the Agency's lawyers drafted a proposed covert-action finding, it was reviewed
by "The Lawyers' Group," which was chaired by the NSC's legal counsel and
included lawyers from the State Department, Defense Department, Justice
Department, and CIA. After the lawyers flyspecked it, the proposed finding was
reviewed further by the cabinet-level national security policy makers, where
among others the Vice President weighed in. Only then did it move to the
President's desk. But in this critical instance, the CIA would be gaining
fearsome new powers with very little debate - none of it public. The Agency was taking on new responsibilities in areas where it had no expertise, such as
interrogation and detention." [emphasis supplied]
Yep - look again at what that finding contained, according to Mayer (p.39):
"...the finding called for the President to delegate blanket authority to Tenet
to decide on a case-by-case basis whom to kill, whom to kidnap, whom to detain
and interrogate, and how...It authorized the CIA's officers to break and enter
into private property, and to monitor the communications and financial
transactions of suspected terrorists, even inside the United States when
necessary, as well."
This is a far cry from "The White House dictates the policy." A bit of mud in the eye to those anti-torture investigation zealots, isn't it (esp. those who say "we know enough already")? The Bush administration authorized various illegal techniques through such irregular, distorted processes, that it's impossible to say we know enough already about what happened. And if we know that CIA lawyers laid the groundwork for torture, then what? Is there no consequence for that? Every memo must be revealed - and in the context of Holder's ability to prosecute. I have a feeling that what will come out during an investigation is going to be very, very embarrassing for all involved - and criminal prosecution may be well deserved.